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This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric
information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents
who have either Bewley’s incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler’s maximin
expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim eﬃcient alloca-
tions under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors,
thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of
a trade which makes all agents better oﬀ at any realization of private information.
For agents with the incomplete preferences, the condition is necessary and suﬃcient,
but for agents with the maximin expected utility preferences, the condition is suﬃ-
cient only. A couple of necessary conditions for the latter case are provided.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D81, D82, D84.
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11 Introduction
This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric informa-
tion. There are a ﬁnite number of states and in each state there is a single good. There
are a ﬁnite number of agents and each agent has private information about the states.
We model uncertainty by so called multiple priors; that is, for each agent, uncertainty
is represented by sets of priors and sets of posteriors. The good is evaluated by concave
utility index functions, from which agents derive either Bewley’s [4] incomplete pref-
erences (BI-preferences for short) or Gilboa-Schmeidler’s [10] maximin expected utility
preferences (MEU-preferences for short).
Prior sets induce preferences in the ex ante stage (before the receipt of private infor-
mation) and posterior sets induce preferences in the interim stage (after the receipt of
private information). An allocation is ex ante eﬃcient if there is no feasible trade which
makes all agents better oﬀ in the ex ante sage. Bewley [3] and Rigotti and Shannon [22]
characterized ex ante eﬃcient allocations by prior sets for agents with BI-preferences,
and Billot et al. [2] characterized ex ante eﬃcient allocations similarly for agents with
MEU-preferences.1 An allocation is interim eﬃcient if there is no feasible trade which
makes all agents better oﬀ in the interim sage for any realization of private information.
No attempt has been made to obtain a counterpart for interim eﬃcient allocations as far
as we are aware of.
The purpose of this paper is to provide characterizations of interim eﬃcient allo-
cations by posterior sets for agents with BI-preferences and MEU-preferences. The key
concept in our characterizations is the compatible prior set of an agent, which is deﬁned
as the collection of all the probability distributions such that, for each piece of private
information of the agent, the conditional probability distributions are in the correspond-
ing posterior set of the agent. The compatible prior set of an agent coincides with the
convex hull of all posteriors of the agent. The main results show the following: for agents
with BI-preferences, an allocation is interim eﬃcient if and only if it is ex ante eﬃcient
for agents possessing their compatible prior sets as their own prior sets; and for agents
with MEU-preferences, an allocation is interim eﬃcient if the same condition holds, but
not vice versa. Thus, ex ante eﬃciency with respect to the compatible prior sets is nec-
essary and suﬃcient for interim eﬃciency for the former case, but it is suﬃcient only for
1Strzalecki [24] characterized ex ante eﬃcient allocations for agents with more general preferences.
2the latter case. To obtain a sharper result tor the latter case, we restrict our attention
to a limited class of allocations and provide a couple of necessary conditions for interim
eﬃciency.
In the standard Bayesian models, Morris [19] and Feinberg [9] provided a characteri-
zation of interim eﬃcient allocations,2 which is closely related to the agreement theorem
of Aumann [1]. The agreement theorem in this context asserts that if agents with linear
utility index functions have a common prior, then an allocation is interim eﬃcient. The
result of Morris [19] and Feinberg [9] implies the converse: if an allocation is interim
eﬃcient for agents with linear utility index functions, then there is a prior which induces
all the agents’ posteriors; that is, it appears as if they share a ﬁctitious common prior.
Our results have the corresponding implication when utility index functions are linear;
that is, for agents with BI-preferences, an allocation is interim eﬃcient if and only if
the compatible prior sets of all agents have a non-empty intersection, whose element is
interpreted as a ﬁctitious common prior.
Characterizations of interim eﬃcient allocations are important in the context of the
no trade theorem [18]: it asserts that any ex ante eﬃcient allocation is interim eﬃcient,
as interpreted by Holmstr¨ om and Myerson [15], and thus purely speculative trade is
impossible. A simple and intuitive explanation for the no trade theorem is that agents
in the standard Bayesian models are dynamically consistent. By combining the charac-
terization of ex ante eﬃcient allocations and that of interim eﬃcient allocations, we can
obtain a necessary and suﬃcient condition for any ex ante allocation to be interim eﬃ-
cient for agents with BI-preferences.3 Using this condition, we show that if agents with
BI-preferences derive posterior sets from prior sets by prior-by-prior Bayesian updating,
then the no trade theorem holds. We also argue that agents with BI-preferences are
dynamically consistent indeed. On the other hand, for agents with MEU-preferences,
the no trade theorem does not hold because agents are not dynamically consistent. Ep-
stein and Schneider [7] and Wakai [25] identiﬁed a suﬃcient condition for agents to be
dynamically consistent by introducing rectangular prior sets. The compatible prior sets
in this paper turn out to be rectangular prior sets, which explains why ex ante eﬃciency
with respect to the compatible prior sets is suﬃcient for interim eﬃciency.
2See also Samet [23] and Ng [20].
3On the no trade theorem in more general non-expected utility models, see Dow et al. [5], Ma [17],
and Halevy [13].
3The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
reports the characterization of interim eﬃcient allocations for agents with BI-preferences,
and Section 4 reports that for agents with MEU-preferences. Section 5 discusses issues of
dynamic consistency, the agreement theorem, and conditional preferences in the multiple
priors models.
2 Setup
In this section, we set up the model of an exchange economy under uncertainty with
asymmetric information. There is a ﬁnite set of sates Ω = {1,...,n}.4 Let ∆(Ω) be
the set of all probability distributions over Ω, and let P ( 2∆(Ω) be the collection of
all non-empty, convex, and closed subsets of ∆(Ω). For p ∈ ∆(Ω) and z ∈ RΩ, let
Ep[z] =
∑
ω2Ω p(ω)z(ω) be the expected value of a random variable z with respect to p.
We write EP[z] = minp2P Ep[z] for P ∈ P, which is the minimum expected value of z
where the minimum is taken over P. Note that the minimum exists because each P ∈ P is
compact. For a function f : R → R and z ∈ RΩ, we write Ep[f(z)] =
∑
ω2Ω p(ω)f(z(ω))
for p ∈ ∆(Ω) and EP[f(z)] = minp2P Ep[f(z)] for P ∈ P with some abuse of notation.
There is a ﬁnite set of agents I = {1,...,I}. Agent i ∈ I has an information partition
Πi ( 2Ω of Ω with a generic element πi ∈ Πi. We write πi(ω) ∈ Πi for the partition
element containing ω ∈ Ω; agent i observes πi(ω) as private information when the true
state is ω. Agent i has a set of priors Pi ∈ P, which represents his prior beliefs, and a
set of posteriors Φi(πi) ∈ P for each πi ∈ Πi, which represents his posterior beliefs after
observing πi. We write Φi = {Φi(πi)}πi2Πi for the collection of all posteriors of agent i.
For Pi, we assume that maxp2Pi p(πi) > 0 for each πi ∈ Πi, and for Φi, we assume that
p(πi) = 1 for each p ∈ Φi(πi) and πi ∈ Πi.5
There is a single good in the economy, and agent i ∈ I has a concave, strictly in-
creasing, and continuously diﬀerentiable6 utility index function ui : R+ → R, which to-
gether with Pi and Φi induces Bewley’s incomplete preferences [4] or Gilboa-Schmeidler’s
maximin expected utility preferences [10]. Let xi,x0
i ∈ RΩ
+ be contingent consumption
4We use a ﬁnite set of states to avoid topological and measure theoretic complications.
5It might be natural to assume some relationship between Pi and Φi by some updating rule, but we
assume nothing a priori.
6A similar analysis can be done with continuity only; by concavity, ui has the right derivative every-
where, and replace u
0
i with the right derivative.
4bundles. Bewley’s incomplete preferences (BI-preferences for short) are determined as
follows: in the ex ante stage, agent i prefers xi to x0
i if and only if Ep[ui(xi)] > Ep[ui(x0
i)]
for each p ∈ Pi, or equivalently, EPi[ui(xi)−ui(x0
i)] > 0; in the interim stage, agent i with
private information πi ∈ Πi prefers xi to x0
i if and only if Ep[ui(xi)] > Ep[ui(x0
i)] for each
p ∈ Φi(πi), or equivalently, EΦi(πi)[ui(xi) − ui(x0
i)] > 0. Gilboa-Schmeidler’s maximin
expected utility preferences (MEU-preferences for short) are determined as follows: in
the ex ante stage, agent i prefers xi to x0
i if and only if EPi[ui(xi)] > EPi[ui(x0
i)]; in the
interim stage, agent i with private information πi ∈ Πi prefers xi to x0
i if and only if
EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] > EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i)].
An allocation is x = (x1,...,xI) ∈ RΩ£I
+ where xi ∈ RΩ
+ is a contingent consumption
bundle of agent i ∈ I. To avoid cumbersome boundary arguments, we restrict our
attention to an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ in the following analysis. We call t =
(t1,...,tI) ∈ RΩ£I a feasible trade at an allocation x if
∑
i2I ti = 0 and x + t is also an
allocation. We say that an allocation x is ex ante eﬃcient if there is no feasible trade t
at x such that, in the ex ante stage, agent i prefers xi + ti to xi for each i ∈ I. We say
that an allocation x is interim eﬃcient if there is no feasible trade t at x such that, in
the interim stage, agent i with any private information πi ∈ Πi prefers xi + ti to xi for
each i ∈ I. Note that these concept of eﬃciency are deﬁned for both BI-preferences and
MEU-preferences.
3 Eﬃciency with BI-preferences
In this section, we assume that all agents have BI-preferences. We ﬁrst review the
characterization of ex ante eﬃcient allocations due to Bewley [3] and Rigotti and Shannon
[22].
For each i ∈ I, xi ∈ RΩ










: p ∈ P
}
, (1)
which is the set of marginal-utility weighted priors at the bundle xi. If ui(·) is linear or
xi(·) is constant, then u0
i(xi(·)) is constant, and thus Ξi(P,xi) = P.
Bewley [3] and Rigotti and Shannon [22] have established the following result.
5Proposition 1 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences. An interior allocation x ∈
RΩ£I
++ is ex ante eﬃcient if and only if
∩
i2I
Ξi(Pi,xi)  = ∅. (2)
To appreciate Proposition 1, recall that the fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics assert that eﬃciency is equivalent to the existence of a common supporting vector
of agents’ upper contour sets. It can be shown that Ξi(Pi,xi) is the set of all normalized
supporting vectors of the upper contour set {ti ∈ RΩ : EPi[ui(xi + ti) − ui(xi)] > 0}.
Thus, (2) is equivalent to the existence of a common supporting vector. In this sense,
Proposition 1 is essentially the fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
We use Proposition 1 to characterize interim eﬃcient allocations. The key concept
in our characterization is a special set of probability distributions over Ω derived from
Φi, which is deﬁned as follows. For each i ∈ I, p ∈ ∆(Ω) is said to be a Φi-compatible
prior if p(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi) for each πi ∈ Πi with p(πi) > 0 where p(·|πi) is the conditional
probability distribution of p given πi, i.e., p(E|πi) = p(E ∩ πi)/p(πi) for each E ∈ 2Ω.
Let P¤
i be the collection of all Φi-compatible priors, which is our key concept. We refers
to P¤
i as the Φi-compatible prior set.
Note that p ∈ P¤
i if and only if there exists q ∈ ∆(Ω) and r(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi) for each
πi ∈ Πi such that p =
∑












πi2Πi q(πi)r(·|πi) : r(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi)
}
. In addition, P¤
i is










by (3) and the following result in convex analysis.7
Lemma 1 Let {Ck}m














7See Theorem 3.3 of Rockafellar [21], for example.
6Therefore, P¤
i is non-empty, convex, and closed, i.e., P¤
i ∈ P, since Φi(πi) is non-
empty, convex, and closed for each πi ∈ Πi. The expression (4) results in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 For any z ∈ RΩ, it holds that EP¤
i [z] = minπi2Πi EΦi(πi)[z].
Proof. By (4), EP¤
i [z] = minp2P¤
i Ep[z] = minp2co(
S
πi2Πi Φi(πi)) Ep[z]. Since the minimum
minp2co(
S


















By Lemma 2, a characterization of interim eﬃcient allocations can be reduced to
that for ex ante eﬃcient allocations with a set of priors P¤
i , which is “ﬁctitious” in the
sense that P¤
i may be diﬀerent from the “true” set of priors Pi. This leads us to the
following main result of this paper.
Proposition 2 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences. An interior allocation x ∈
RΩ£I




i ,xi)  = ∅. (5)
Proof. By Proposition 1, (5) holds if and only if there is no feasible trade t at x such that
EP¤[ui(xi+ti)−ui(xi)] > 0 for each i ∈ I. Setting z = (ui(xi(ω)+ti(ω))−ui(xi(ω)))ω2Ω ∈
RΩ in Lemma 2, we see that this is true if and only if there is no feasible trade t at x
such that EΦi(πi)[ui(xi + ti) − ui(xi)] > 0 for each πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I. Therefore, (5)
holds if and only if x is interim eﬃcient.
For example, suppose that ui is linear for each i ∈ I. Then, Ξi(P¤
i ,xi) = P¤
i for each
xi ∈ RΩ
++ and i ∈ I, and thus the condition (5) is reduced to
∩
i2I P¤
i  = ∅. Especially,
when Φi(πi) is a singleton for each πi ∈ Πi,
∩
i2I P¤
i  = ∅ is equivalent to the existence
of a ﬁctitious common prior p ∈ ∆(Ω) such that Φi(πi) = {p(·|πi)} for each πi ∈ Πi
with p(πi) > 0 and i ∈ I. In this case, Proposition 2 says that the existence of a
ﬁctitious common prior is necessary and suﬃcient for interim eﬃciency, which is the
result obtained by Morris [19] and Feinberg [9].
7We use Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 to study the possibility of purely speculative
trade. Recall that interim eﬃciency of an allocation implies non-existence of a trade to
which all agents agree in the interim stage under any realization of private information.
Thus, if any ex ante eﬃcient allocation is interim eﬃcient, speculative trade is impossible.
In the standard Bayesian models, any ex ante eﬃcient allocation is automatically interim
eﬃcient as shown by Milgrom and Stokey [18], which we refer to as the no trade theorem.
The following result provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the no trade theorem
to hold in our model. Since we do not assume any updating rule yet, the condition is
stated in terms of the relationship between P1,...,PI and Φ1,...,ΦI. We omit a proof
because it is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Corollary 3 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences. The following two conditions
are equivalent: (i) any ex ante eﬃcient allocation x ∈ RΩ£I




i2I Ξi(Pi,xi)  = ∅ implies
∩
i2I Ξi(P¤
i ,xi)  = ∅.
Since P¤
i is derived from Φi, the condition (ii) above is a requirement for the relation-
ship between P1,...,PI and Φ1,...,ΦI. Thus, it is interesting to ask if the condition
(ii) is satisﬁed for a given updating rule of multiple priors, which induces Φi from Pi.
Note that, in the standard Bayesian models, the condition (ii) is always true. We study
this question for two popular updating rules of multiple priors in the remainder of this
section.8
One updating rule of multiple priors is the full Bayesian updating rule. We say that
Φi is the full Bayesian updating (FB-updating for short) of Pi if
Φi(πi) = cl{p(·|πi) : p ∈ Pi with p(πi) > 0} for each πi ∈ Πi,
where clP denotes the closure of P ⊆ ∆(Ω). The FB-updating is the collection of all
conditional probability distributions of the priors in Pi. It can be checked that Φi(πi) is
a non-empty,9 convex, and closed subset of ∆(Ω) and thus Φi(πi) ∈ P. Observe that Φi
is the FB-updating of the Φi-compatible prior set P¤
i . Furthermore, P¤
i is maximal in
the following sense.
Lemma 3 If Φi is the FB-updating of Pi, then Pi ⊆ P¤
i .
8See Gilboa and Schmeidler [11] for the study of updating rules, for example.
9Recall that, by the assumption on Pi, maxp2Pi p(πi) > 0 for each πi ∈ Πi.
8Proof. Recall that P¤
i consists of all probability distributions over Ω of the form p =
∑
πi2Πi q(πi)r(·|πi) where q ∈ ∆(Ω) and r(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi). If Φi is the FB-updating of Pi,
then, for any p ∈ Pi, p =
∑
πi2Πi p(πi)r(·|πi) with r(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi) and r(·|πi) = p(·|πi) if
pi(πi) > 0. This implies that p ∈ P¤
i and thus Pi ⊆ P¤
i .
Corollary 3 and Lemma 3 implies that any ex ante eﬃcient allocation is interim
eﬃcient if all agents adopt the FB-updating.
Proposition 4 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences and that Φi is the FB-
updating of Pi for each i ∈ I. Then, any ex ante eﬃcient allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ is
interim eﬃcient.
Proof. By Lemma 3, Pi ⊆ P¤
i for each i ∈ I. This implies that Ξi(Pi,xi) ⊆ Ξi(P¤
i ,xi)
for each xi ∈ RΩ
++. Thus, if
∩
i2I Ξi(Pi,xi)  = ∅, then
∩
i2I Ξi(P¤
i ,xi)  = ∅. Therefore, by
Corollary 3, any ex ante allocation is interim eﬃcient.
Especially, suppose that ui is linear and that Φi is the FB-updating of Pi for each
i ∈ I. If agents’ prior sets are common, then any interior allocation is interim eﬃcient
by Proposition 1 and Proposition 4. The converse is not necessarily true. In the next
example, though there is no prior set P such that Φi is the FB-updating of P for each
i ∈ I, any interior allocation is interim eﬃcient. This is in a sharp contrast with the




∅ implies the existence of p ∈ ∆(Ω) such that Φi is the FB-updating of {p} for each i ∈ I.
Example 1 Let Ω = {1,2,3,4} and I = {1,2}. For agent 1, let Π1 = {{1,2},{3,4}},
P1 = {p ∈ ∆(Ω) : p(1) = p(3) = 1/6, p(2) ≥ 1/6, p(4) ≥ 1/6}, Φ1({1,2}) = {p ∈ ∆(Ω) :
p(1)+p(2) = 1, 1/4 ≤ p(1) ≤ 1/2}, and Φ1({3,4}) = {p ∈ ∆(Ω) : p(3)+p(4) = 1, 1/4 ≤
p(3) ≤ 1/2}. For agent 2, let Π2 = {Ω} and P2 = Φ2(Ω) = {(1/8,3/8,1/8,3/8)}. It
can be checked that Φi is the FB-updating of Pi for each i. Note that P¤
1 = {(αq,α(1 −
q),(1 − α)r,(1 − α)(1 − r)) ∈ ∆(Ω) : q,r ∈ [1/4,1/2], α ∈ [0,1]} and P¤
2 = Φ2(Ω) =
{(1/8,3/8,1/8,3/8)}. Let ui be linear for each i. Then, by Proposition 2, any interior
allocation is interim eﬃcient because P¤
1 ∩ P¤
2 = P¤
2  = ∅. On the other hand, by
Proposition 1, no interior allocation is ex ante eﬃcient because P1 ∩ P2 = ∅. Moreover,
in this example, there is no common prior set P ∈ P such that Φi is the FB-updating of
P for each i. In fact, if Φ1 is the FB-updating of P, then P cannot be a singleton, and
9if Φ2 is the FB-updating of P, then P = Φ2(Ω), which is a singleton. Thus, P cannot
be a common prior set which induces both Φ1 and Φ2.
Another updating rule of multiple priors is the maximum likelihood updating rule.
We say that Φi is the maximum likelihood updating (ML-updating for short) of Pi if
Φi(πi) = cl{p(·|πi) : p ∈ arg max
p02Pi
p0(πi)} for all πi ∈ Πi.
The ML-updating is the collection of all conditional probability distributions of the
priors in Pi that maximize the likelihood of the observed private information. As the
next example of the ML-updating shows, an ex ante eﬃcient allocation is not necessarily
interim eﬃcient even if agents have a common prior set, which is diﬀerent from the result
for the FB-updating.
Example 2 Let Ω, I, and Πi be those given in Example 1 for each i ∈ I. Let P1 = P2 =
{p ∈ ∆(Ω) : p(1) = p(3) = 1/6, p(2) ≥ 1/6, p(4) ≥ 1/6}, Φ1({1,2}) = {(1/4,3/4,0,0)},
Φ1({3,4}) = {(0,0,1/4,3/4)}, and Φ2(Ω) = P2. It can be checked that Φi is the ML-
updating of Pi for each i. Note that P¤
1 = {(α/4,3α/4,(1−α)/4,3(1−α)/4) : α ∈ [0,1]}
and P¤
2 = P2. Let ui be linear for each i. By Proposition 1, any interior allocation is




4 Eﬃciency with MEU-preferences
In this section, we assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. We ﬁrst review and
generalize the characterization of ex ante eﬃcient allocations due to Billot et al. [2].
For a set of priors Pi ∈ P and a contingent consumption bundle xi ∈ RΩ
+ of agent
i ∈ I, we call p ∈ Pi an active prior of agent i in Pi at xi if p minimizes Ep[ui(xi)] over
Pi, i.e., Ep[ui(xi)] = EPi[ui(xi)]. Let Pi(xi) be the collection of all active priors of agent




Since Ep[ui(xi)] is linear in p ∈ Pi and Pi ∈ P is non-empty, convex, and closed, Pi(xi)
is also non-empty, convex, and closed, i.e., Pi(xi) ∈ P. Note that if xi(·) is constant,
then Ep[ui(xi)] is also constant over p ∈ ∆(Ω) and thus Pi(xi) = Pi.
The following proposition characterizes ex ante eﬃcient allocations.
10Proposition 5 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. An interior allocation
x ∈ RΩ£I
++ is ex ante eﬃcient if and only if
∩
i2I
Ξi(Pi(xi),xi)  = ∅. (6)
As Proposition 1 is essentially the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, so is
Proposition 5 where Ξi(Pi(xi),xi) is the set of all normalized supporting vectors of the
upper contour set {ti ∈ RΩ : EPi[ui(xi + ti)] > EPi[ui(xi)]}. Billot et al. [2] showed
a special case10 of Proposition 5 in which an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ has the full
insurance property, i.e., xi(·) is constant for each i ∈ I. In this case, every prior is






i2I Pi  = ∅, which is the condition Billot et al. [2] found. In the context of asset pricing
models with a representative agent (with MEU preferences), it is well known that active
priors determine the supporting vectors [6, 8]. Proposition 5 is a natural consequence of
this, but, to the best of our knowledge, no work has explicitly stated it. So we give a
formal proof based upon the fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the appendix.
Let P¤
i (xi) = argminp2P¤
i Ep[ui(xi)] denote the sets of all active Φi-compatible priors.
By replacing Pi(xi) with P¤
i (xi) in (6), we obtain the following characterization of interim
eﬃcient allocations.
Proposition 6 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. An interior allocation
x ∈ RΩ£I




i (xi),xi)  = ∅. (7)
If an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ is interim eﬃcient and the interim expected utility
EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] is constant over πi ∈ Πi for each i ∈ I, then (7) holds.
Note that the condition (7) is suﬃcient but not necessary for interim eﬃciency. In
fact, in some cases, an allocation is interim eﬃcient even if (7) is not true, and in that
case, a sharper characterization is possible. We say that an allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
+ has
the full insurance property in the interim stage if, for each πi ∈ Πi and each i ∈ I, the
restriction of xi(·) to πi is constant. Clearly, if x has the full insurance property, then it
has it in the interim stage, but not vice versa.
10The state space of Billot et al. [2] is a general measurable space.
11Proposition 7 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. Let an interior allocation
x ∈ RΩ£I
++ have the full insurance property in the interim stage. Then, x is interim
eﬃcient if and only if ∩
i2I
Ξi(P¤
i ,xi)  = ∅. (8)
Note that, since P¤
i (xi) ( P¤
i generically, (8) is strictly weaker than (7). This shows
that the condition (7) is not necessary for interim eﬃciency.
We ﬁrst prove Proposition 6 using the following lemma.
Lemma 4 For any z,z0 ∈ RΩ, if EΦi(πi)[z] > EΦi(πi)[z0] for each πi ∈ Πi, then EP¤
i [z] >
EP¤
i [z0]. Suppose that EΦi(πi)[z0] is constant over πi ∈ Πi. Then, EΦi(πi)[z] > EΦi(πi)[z0]
for each πi ∈ Πi if and only if EP¤
i [z] > EP¤
i [z0].
Proof. By Lemma 2, EP¤
i [z] = minπi2Πi EΦi(πi)[z] and EP¤
i [z0] = minπi2Πi EΦi(πi)[z0].
This implies that if EΦi(πi)[z] > EΦi(πi)[z0] for each πi ∈ Πi, then EP¤
i [z] > EP¤
i [z0].
Let z0 ∈ RΩ satisfy EΦi(πi)[z0] = c ∈ R for each πi ∈ Πi. Note that EP¤
i [z0] =
minπi2Πi EΦi(πi)[z0] = c. Suppose that EΦi(π0
i)[z] ≤ c for some π0
i ∈ Πi. Then, EP¤
i [z] =
minπi2Πi EΦi(πi)[z] ≤ EΦi(π0
i)[z] ≤ c = EP¤




i ∈ Πi then EP¤
i [z] ≤ EP¤
i [z0]. This implies that if EP¤
i [z] > EP¤
i [z0] then
EΦi(πi)[z] > EΦi(πi)[z0] for each πi ∈ Πi.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that (7) holds. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that x
is not interim eﬃcient. Then, there exists a feasible trade t at x such that EΦi(πi)[ui(xi+
ti)] > EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] for each πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I. By Lemma 4, this implies that
EP¤
i [ui(xi + ti)] > EP¤
i [ui(xi)] for each i ∈ I. On the other hand, Proposition 5 implies
that if (7) is true, then there is no feasible trade t at x such that EP¤
i [ui(xi + ti)] >
EP¤
i [ui(xi)] for each i ∈ I, a contradiction. Thus, the ﬁrst half of the proposition is
established.
To establish the second half, assume that x is interim eﬃcient and EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] is
constant over πi ∈ Πi for each i ∈ I. It is enough to show that there is no feasible trade
t at x such that EP¤
i [ui(xi +ti)] > EP¤
i [ui(xi)] for each i ∈ I because if this is true then
(7) holds by Proposition 5. Seeking a contradiction, suppose otherwise and let t be a
feasible trade at x such that EP¤
i [ui(xi + ti)] > EP¤
i [ui(xi)] for each i ∈ I. Then, by
Lemma 4, EΦi(πi)[ui(xi +ti)] > EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] for each πi ∈ Πi, which contradicts to the
interim eﬃciency of x. Thus, the second half of the proposition is established.
12In the proof of Proposition 7, the following lemma is essential.
Lemma 5 Let xi,x0
i ∈ RΩ
+ be contingent consumption bundles of agent i ∈ I. Fix
πi ∈ Πi and suppose that the restriction of xi(·) to πi is constant. Then, in the interim
stage when agent i’s private information is πi, agent i with MEU-preferences prefers x0
i
to xi if and only if agent i with BI-preferences prefers x0
i to xi; that is, EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i)] −
EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] > 0 if and only if EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i) − ui(xi)] > 0.




i)] − ui(c) = EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i) − ui(c)] = EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i) − ui(xi)].
Therefore, EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i)]−EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] > 0 if and only if EΦi(πi)[ui(x0
i)−ui(xi)] > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ have the full insurance
property in the interim stage. By Lemma 5, for a feasible trade t at x, EΦi(πi)[ui(xi +
ti)] − EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] > 0 if and only if EΦi(πi)[ui(xi + ti) − ui(xi)] > 0 for each πi ∈ Πi
and i ∈ I. This implies that x is interim eﬃcient with MEU-preferences if and only if it
is interim eﬃcient with BI-preferences. Therefore, by Proposition 2, x is interim eﬃcient
with MEU-preferences if and only if (8) holds.
To understand the role of the assumptions on allocations in Proposition 6 and Propo-
sition 7, consider the following example.
Example 3 Let Ω, I, and Πi be those given in Example 1 for each i ∈ I. Let P1 and Φ1
be those given in Example 1 and set P2 = Φ2(Ω) = P1. Note that Φi is the FB-updating
of Pi for each i ∈ I. Let ui(c) = c for each c ∈ R+ and i ∈ I.
Suppose that x1 = (1,3,1,3) and x2 = (3,1,3,1). Note that EΦ1(f1,2g)[u1(x1)] =
EΦ1(f3,4g)[u1(x1)] = 2 and thus EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] is constant over πi ∈ Πi for each i ∈ I. We
have P1(x1) = P1, P2(x2) = P2, P¤
1(x1) = {(α/2,α/2,(1−α)/2,(1−α)/2) ∈ ∆(Ω) : α ∈
[0,1]}, and P¤
2(x2) = P2(x2) = P2. Thus, P1(x1) ∩ P2(x2)  = ∅ and P¤
1(x1) ∩ P¤
2(x2) = ∅.
By Proposition 5, x is ex ante eﬃcient, and by Proposition 6, x is not interim eﬃcient.
Thus, the no trade theorem fails under the FB-updating.
Suppose that x1 = (1,1,3,3) and x2 = (1,1,1,1). Note that x has the full insurance
property in the interim stage. We have P1(x1) = {(1/6,1/2,1/6,1/6)}, P2(x2) = P2,
13P¤
1(x1) = {(q,1 − q,0,0) : q ∈ [1/4,1/2]}, and P¤
2(x2) = P2(x2) = P2. Thus, P1(x1) ∩
P2(x2)  = ∅, P¤
1(x1) ∩ P¤
2(x2) = ∅, and P¤
1 ∩ P¤
2  = ∅. By Proposition 5, x is ex ante
eﬃcient, and by Proposition 7, x is interim eﬃcient. So this is an instance where (8) is
strictly weaker than (7).
We can use Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 to study the possibility of speculative
trade for agents with MEU preferences. The following corollaries are the counter parts of
Corollary 3 in the previous section. We omit proofs because they are direct consequences
of Proposition 5, Proposition 6, and Proposition 7.
Corollary 8 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. Let an interior allocation
x ∈ RΩ£I
++ be such that the interim expected utility EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)] is constant over πi ∈ Πi
for each i ∈ I. The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) if x is ex ante eﬃcient,
then it is interim eﬃcient; (ii) if
∩
i2I Ξi(Pi(xi),xi)  = ∅, then
∩
i2I Ξi(P¤
i (xi),xi)  = ∅.
Corollary 9 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. Let an interior allocation
x ∈ RΩ£I
++ have the full insurance property in the interim stage. The following two
conditions are equivalent: (i) if x is ex ante eﬃcient, then it is interim eﬃcient; (ii) if
∩
i2I Ξi(Pi(xi),xi)  = ∅, then
∩
i2I Ξi(P¤
i ,xi)  = ∅.
By showing that the FB-updating satisﬁes the condition (ii) in Corollary 9, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 10 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences and that Φi is the FB-
updating of Pi for each i ∈ I. Let an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ have the full insurance
property in the interim stage. If x is ex ante eﬃcient, then it is interim eﬃcient.
Proof. Since Pi is the FB-updating of Φi, Pi(xi) ⊆ Pi ⊆ P¤





i ,xi), which implies (ii) in Corollary 9.
5 Discussions
5.1 Dynamic consistency
Proposition 4 have established the no trade theorem in the multiple priors models with
BI-preferences and FB-updating. As is well known, the no trade theorem in the standard
14Bayesian models is a consequence of dynamic consistency of agents’ behavior. Thus, it
is natural to ask whether Proposition 4 can be understood as a consequence of some




+ be contingent consumption bundles. We deﬁne dynamic consistency
as follows. Agent i ∈ I is said to be dynamically consistent if agent i prefers xi to x0
i
in the ex ante stage whenever agent i with every private information πi ∈ Πi prefers xi
to x0
i in the interim stage. If every agent is dynamically consistent, then any ex ante
eﬃcient allocation is interim eﬃcient.11 The following lemma shows that agents with
BI-preferences and FB-updating is dynamically consistent.
Lemma 6 Assume that agent i ∈ I has BI-preferences and that Φi is the FB-updating
of Pi. Then, agent i is dynamically consistent.
Proof. Suppose that agent i with each πi ∈ Πi prefers xi to x0
i in the interim stage. Then,
EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)−ui(x0
i)] > 0 for each πi ∈ Πi. Since Φi is the FB-updating of Pi, for each


































Therefore, agent i prefers xi to x0
i in the ex ante stage.
On the other hand, agents with MEU-preferences are not necessarily dynamically
consistent. Epstein and Schneider [7] and Wakai [25] identiﬁed a class of priors and
11If an allocation x is not interim eﬃcient, there exists another allocation x
0 such that every player
with every private information prefers x
0
i to xi in the interim stage. If agents are dynamically consistent,
then every player prefers x
0
i to xi in the ex ante stage, implying that x is not ex ante eﬃcient.
15posteriors with which agents are dynamically consistent. A set of priors Pi ∈ P is said







Note that if Pi is a Φi-rectangular prior set, then Φi must be the FB-updating of Pi, but







holds where this set inclusion may be strict in general. As shown by Epstein and Schnei-
der [7] and Wakai [25], agents with MEU-preferences and rectangular prior sets are
dynamically consistent. Based upon this, Wakai [25] showed the following result.
Proposition 11 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences and that Pi is a Φi-
rectangular prior set for each i ∈ I. Then, any ex ante eﬃcient allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ is
interim eﬃcient.
Proposition 11 explains the ﬁrst part of Proposition 6 because P¤
i is a Φi-rectangular
prior set. The following result is immediate from (3) and (9).
Lemma 7 The Φi-compatible prior set P¤
i is the Φi-rectangular set such that Pi ⊆ P¤
i
for any Φi-rectangular prior set Pi.
Suppose that Pi = P¤
i for each i ∈ I. If an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ satisﬁes (7),
then x is ex ante eﬃcient by Proposition 5. Thus, dynamic consistency implies that it
is also interim eﬃcient, which corresponds to the ﬁrst part of Proposition 6.
5.2 Conditional preferences
Up to this point, it has been posterior beliefs that induce interim preferences. But there
is a direct way to derive interim preferences from ex ante preferences without using pos-
terior beliefs, which we refer to as conditional preferences. When general preferences are
considered (that is, beliefs are not necessarily speciﬁed separately), conditional prefer-
ences are regarded as a natural candidate for interim preferences. In this subsection, we
brieﬂy discuss an implication of our results for the “conditional preferences” approach.
12We adopt this term from Epstein and Schneider [7].
16Let ex ante preferences of agent i ∈ I be given, which may be any preferences. For
two contingent consumption bundles xi,x0
i ∈ RΩ
+ and an event E ∈ 2Ω, let xiEx0
i ∈
RΩ
+ be the contingent consumption bundle deﬁned by xiEx0
i(ω) = xi(ω) if ω ∈ E and
xiEx0
i(ω) = x0
i(ω) otherwise. Note that agent i having xiEx0
i consumes xi on E and
x0
i on Ω\E. We say that agent i conditionally prefers xi to x0
i on πi if agent i prefers
xiπix0
i to x0
i in the ex ante stage. Deﬁne interim preferences by the following rule: in
the interim stage, agent i with private information πi ∈ Πi prefers xi to x0
i if and only
if agent i conditionally prefers xi to x0
i on πi. We call this type of induced interim
preferences conditional preferences. We say that an allocation is conditionally eﬃcient
if it is interim eﬃcient with the understanding that interim preferences of all agents are
conditional preferences.
By construction, conditional preferences are uniquely determined from ex ante pref-
erences. On the other hand, given a set of priors, there is a variety of ways of specifying a
set of posteriors in our setup. Thus in general, interim preferences induced by posterior
beliefs do not necessarily coincide with conditional preferences. But in some cases, they
do. An important example is an agent with BI-preferences and the FB-updating.
Lemma 8 Assume that agent i ∈ I has BI-preferences and that Φi is the FB-updating
of Pi. For xi,x0
i ∈ RΩ
+ and πi ∈ Πi, if agent i conditionally prefers xi to x0
i on πi, then
agent i with private information πi prefers xi to x0
i in the interim stage. If p(πi) > 0 for
each p ∈ Pi and agent i with private information πi prefers xi to x0
i in the interim stage,
then agent i conditionally prefers xi to x0
i on πi.
Proof. By deﬁnition, agent i conditionally prefers xi to x0

































Since Φi is the FB-updating of Pi, the above inequality implies EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)−ui(x0
i)] > 0.
If p(πi) > 0 for each p ∈ Pi, then EΦi(πi)[ui(xi)−ui(x0
i)] > 0 implies the above inequality.
Using Lemma 8, we can translate our results for agents with BI-preferences and the
FB-updating into those for agents with conditional BI-preferences. To see this, assume
17that all agents have BI-preferences and adopt the FB-updating. By Lemma 8, any
interim eﬃcient allocation is conditionally eﬃcient. Thus, by Proposition 4, any ex ante
eﬃcient allocation is conditionally eﬃcient.
Ma [17] and Halevy [13] considered general complete ex ante preferences and studied
under what condition any ex ante eﬃcient allocation is conditionally eﬃcient. A suf-
ﬁcient condition given by Ma [17] and Halevy [13] is essentially the same as the weak
decomposability axiom introduced by Grant et al. [12]. As shown by Grant et al. [12],
weakly decomposablity is equivalent to dynamic consistency in the sense deﬁned in the
previous subsection with the understanding that interim preferences are replaced with
conditional preferences. This implies that, if all agents have weakly decomposable ex
ante preferences, then any ex ante eﬃcient allocation is conditionally eﬃcient, which is
essentially the “no trade theorem” of Ma [17] and Halevy [13]. Although these works
assume complete preferences, careful reading reveals that the completeness assumption
is not essential in their arguments. In fact, one can show that ex ante BI-preferences
are weakly decomposable, which is consistent with the above discussion on conditional
eﬃciency with ex ante BI-preferences.
5.3 The agreement theorem
Proposition 2 is related to the agreement theorem of Aumann [1] because the agreement
theorem suggests that the existence of a common prior is suﬃcient for interim eﬃciency
in the standard Bayesian models. In fact, as a corollary of Proposition 2, we can obtain
a multiple priors version of the agreement theorem.
Corollary 12 Suppose that
∩
i2I P¤
i  = ∅. Fix an event E ∈ 2Ω. If, for each i ∈ I,
p
i ≡ minp2Φi(πi) p(E) and pi ≡ maxp2Φi(πi) p(E) are constant over all πi ∈ Πi, then
p
i ≤ pj for all i,j ∈ I.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that pj < p
i for some i,j ∈ I with i  = j. We can choose
ci,cj ∈ R++ such that pj < cj < ci < p
i. Let δE ∈ RΩ be the indicator function of
E ∈ 2Ω, i.e., δE(ω) = 1 if ω ∈ E and δE(ω) = 0 otherwise. Note that p
i = EΦi(πi)[δE]
and pj = −EΦj(πj)[−δE] for each πi ∈ Πi and πj ∈ Πj. Let a trade t = (t1,...,tI) ∈ RΩ£I
be such that ti = δE − ci + (ci − cj)/I, tj = cj − δE + (ci − cj)/I, and tk = (ci − cj)/I
for k  = i,j. Note that
∑
k2I tk = 0 and EΦk(πk)[tk] > 0 for each πk ∈ Πk and k ∈ I.
Now consider agents with linear utility index functions uk(c) = c for each c ∈ R+ and
18k ∈ I. Then, for any interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I
++ at which t is a feasible trade,
EΦk(πk)[uk(xk +tk)] ≥ EΦk(πk)[xk]+EΦk(πk)[tk] > EΦk(πk)[xk] = EΦk(πk)[uk(xk)] for each
πk ∈ Πk and k ∈ I, which implies that x is not interim eﬃcient. This contradicts to
∩
k2I P¤
k  = ∅ by Proposition 2.
Note that if Φi(πi) is a singleton for each πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I, then p
i = pi. In this case,
Corollary 12 says that if
∩
i2I P¤
i  = ∅ and all agents’ posterior probabilities of E ∈ 2Ω
are constant over all ω ∈ Ω, then they must coincide, which is the agreement theorem of
Aumann [1].13
Appendix: proof of Proposition 5
We use the fundamental theorems of welfare economics of the following form.
Lemma A Let Ui : RΩ
+ → R be a continuous, strictly increasing, concave utility func-
tion. Let x ∈ RΩ£I
++ be an interior allocation. There is no feasible trade t ∈ RΩ£I at x
such that Ui(xi + ti) > Ui(xi) for each i ∈ I if and only if there exists a price vector
q ∈ RΩ with q  = 0 such that, for each i ∈ I, q · (x0





We start with checking that a price vector q is parallel to a supergradient of Ui. For
a concave function f : Rn → R, a vector s ∈ Rn is a supergradient of f at x ∈ Rn if
f(y) ≤ f(x) + s · (y − x) for all y ∈ Rn.
If f is diﬀerentiable at x, then a supergradient is nothing but the gradient. The su-
perdiﬀerential of f at x, denoted by ∂f(x), is the collection of all supergradients at
x:
∂f(x) = {s ∈ Rn : f(y) ≤ f(x) + s · (y − x) for all y ∈ Rn}.
By the next lemma, a price vector is parallel to a supergradient of a utility function.
(see Theorem 1.3.5 of Lesson D in Hiriart-Urruty and Lemar´ echal [14]).
13Kajii and Ui [16] considered a special case of Corollary 12 assuming that posteriors are the FB-
updating of priors.
19Lemma B Let f : Rn → R be a concave function and suppose 0  ∈ ∂f(x). Then,
q · (y − x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Rn with f(y) ≥ f(x) if and only if q = λs for some λ ≥ 0 and
s ∈ ∂f(x).
Let Ui : RΩ
+ → R be such that Ui(xi) = EPi(ui(xi)) for each xi ∈ RΩ
+ and i ∈ I. It is
straightforward to check that Ui is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave. Thus,
by Lemma A and Lemma B, an interior allocation x ∈ RΩ£I




{q ∈ RΩ : q · (x0
i − xi) ≥ 0 for all x0





{q ∈ RΩ : q = λs for s ∈ ∂Ui(xi), λ ≥ 0}  = {0}.
The above turns out to be equivalent to (6). To see this, we evaluate ∂Ui(xi) using the
following lemma (see Theorem 4.4.2 of Lesson D in Hiriart-Urruty and Lemar´ echal [14]).
Lemma C Let J be a compact set in some metric space, and {fj}j2J be a collection of
concave functions from Rn to R such that functions j  → fj(x) are lower semi-continuous




and let J(x) = {j ∈ J : fj(x) = f(x)}. Assume that f(x) > −∞ for all x ∈ Rn. Then,


































i(xi(ω)))ω2Ω : p ∈ Pi(xi)},
20where the last equality holds since Pi(xi) is convex. Therefore, an interior allocation
x ∈ RΩ£I
++ is ex ante eﬃcient if and only if
∩
i2I





i(xi(ω)))ω2Ω ∈ RΩ : p ∈ Pi(xi), λ ≥ 0}  = {0}.
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